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	<title>MLA Commons | Daan Evers | Activity</title>
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				<title>Daan Evers deposited Street on evolution and the normativity of epistemic reasons in the group Philosophy</title>
				<link>https://hcommons.org/activity/p/1564308/</link>
				<pubDate>Sat, 11 Mar 2017 01:00:01 -0500</pubDate>

									<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Sharon Street (2009) argues that realism about epistemic normativity is false. Realists believe there are truths about epistemic reasons that hold independently of the agent&#8217;s (or anyone else&#8217;s) attitudes. Street argues by dilemma. Either the realist accepts a certain account of the nature of belief, or she does not. If she does, then she cannot&hellip;<span class="activity-read-more" id="activity-read-more-1564308"><a href="https://hcommons.org/activity/p/1564308/" rel="nofollow ugc">[Read more]</a></span></p>
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				<title>Daan Evers deposited Street on evolution and the normativity of epistemic reasons</title>
				<link>https://hcommons.org/activity/p/1564242/</link>
				<pubDate>Fri, 10 Mar 2017 12:57:22 -0500</pubDate>

									<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Sharon Street (2009) argues that realism about epistemic normativity is false. Realists believe there are truths about epistemic reasons that hold independently of the agent&#8217;s (or anyone else&#8217;s) attitudes. Street argues by dilemma. Either the realist accepts a certain account of the nature of belief, or she does not. If she does, then she cannot&hellip;<span class="activity-read-more" id="activity-read-more-1564242"><a href="https://hcommons.org/activity/p/1564242/" rel="nofollow ugc">[Read more]</a></span></p>
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