• In Opposition to Epistemic Modesty

    Author(s):
    Daniel An (see profile) , Andrew Han (see profile) , Syon Mansur (see profile) , David Sanchez (see profile)
    Contributor(s):
    Alexander Deutsch, Esteban Lau
    Date:
    2021
    Subject(s):
    Philosophy, Twenty-first century, Ethics
    Item Type:
    Article
    Tag(s):
    21st-century philosophy, Epistemology, Moral philosophy
    Permanent URL:
    http://dx.doi.org/10.17613/6426-qp28
    Abstract:
    The purpose of this paper is to refute the philosophy of epistemic modesty; we attempt to do so through three types of arguments. 1.) By employing the principle of explosion, as well as the telescoping and Taylor polynomial series of calculus to develop logically-backed arguments and scenarios, we evaluate the definitional vagueness of deep content. Through this established logic, we have found that professor Farid Masrour’s concept of deep content implicates the concept of infinitely deeper content; that infinitely deeper content is unnecessary to definitively determine the truth value of certain content; and that infinitely deeper content can be approximated to determine the definitive truth value of certain other content without 100 percent certainty. 2.) Given the context of infinite impacts, religions and philosophies such as Christianity and absolute deontology justify infinite violence under epistemic modesty. Given that an epistemically modest individual would follow the moral advice of someone more knowledgeable about morality and ethics than themselves, we concluded epistemic modesty to be dangerous. Furthermore, we contended that a core tenet of epistemic modesty – cross-paradigm comparison – is impossible due to the lack of a consistent locus of value between various philosophies. 3.) By applying an alternative epistemological school of thought in order to solve the unhooking problem presented by Masrour, we argue that epistemic modesty is unneeded to detach ordinary projects from anti-skeptical ones. Specifically, epistemic disjunctivism, an immodest epistemology, provides the same advantage in regards to the unhooking problem while aligning more closely to contemporary linguistic norms. The conclusion is that epistemic modesty is implausible as a philosophy.
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    Last Updated:
    2 years ago
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