• Prediction Markets for Science: Is the Cure Worse than the Disease?

    Author(s):
    Mike Thicke (see profile)
    Date:
    2017
    Subject(s):
    Economics, Science--Philosophy
    Item Type:
    Article
    Tag(s):
    climate science, consensus, peer review, Epistemology, Philosophy of science
    Permanent URL:
    http://dx.doi.org/10.17613/ss70-cx04
    Abstract:
    Prediction markets, which trade contracts based on the results of predictions, have been remarkably successful in predicting the results of political events. A number of proposals have been made to extend prediction markets to scientific questions, and some small-scale science prediction markets have been implemented. Advocates for science prediction markets argue that they could alleviate problems in science such as bias in peer review and epistemically unjustified consensus. I argue that bias in peer review and epistemically unjustified consensuses are genuine problems in science, and that current attempts to solve them fail in practical circumstances. Prediction markets do show some promise for answering scientific questions while avoiding the pitfalls of consensus and peer review. However, there are strong reasons to believe that science prediction markets will not perform nearly so well as election prediction markets, and implementing prediction markets on a large scale could have significant unintended consequences for the organization of scientific research. The promise of prediction markets to solve current problems in assessing scientific claims is therefore largely illusory.
    Metadata:
    Published as:
    Journal article    
    Status:
    Published
    Last Updated:
    2 years ago
    License:
    All Rights Reserved
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