• Applied relativism and Davidson's arguments against conceptual schemes

    Author(s):
    Lajos Brons (see profile)
    Date:
    2011
    Subject(s):
    Analysis (Philosophy), Philosophy
    Item Type:
    Article
    Tag(s):
    Donald Davidson, Conceptual Schemes, Analytical philosophy
    Permanent URL:
    http://dx.doi.org/10.17613/M6PM42
    Abstract:
    This paper argues that Davidson's argument against conceptual schemes fail against so-called "Applied Relativisms", i.e. theories of conceptual relativism found outside philosophy such as Whorf's. These theories make no metaphysical claims, which Davidson seems to assume. Ultimately, the misunderstanding (and resulting strawman argument) illustrates (the effect of) differences in conceptual scheme more than that it undermines it.
    Metadata:
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    Published as:
    Journal article     Show details
    Pub. Date:
    2011
    Journal:
    The Science of Mind (精神科学)
    Page Range:
    221 - 240
    Status:
    Published
    Last Updated:
    6 years ago
    License:
    All Rights Reserved
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