**How Informative is the Subjunctive?**

**Background.** Following Stowell (1993), it is often assumed that subjunctive clauses fall into one of two semantic classes: the *intensional* subjunctive, including volitionals and directives and operator-triggered subjunctive clauses. To account for the subjunctive mood in Spanish, syntactic proposals often include special licensing mechanisms (Kempchinsky 1997), or as clauses with indefinite tense (Santos 1997). Semantic proposals have been based on modality (Farkas 1985, et. seq.), non-veridicality (Giannakidou 2006), or model shift (Quer 2001), while pragmatic approaches often rely on the low information status of subjunctive clauses (Gregory 2001). Though providing valuable insights, such analyses fail to capture the entire spectra of properties that mood alternations display cross-linguistically.

**Proposal.** I argue for a tripartite characterization of subjunctive clauses, depending on the pragmatic specification of the matrix predicate as an evaluative, evidential or intensional operator (Gielau 2015). I propose that the subjunctive mood manifests in complements to evaluative predicates as the default mood in the absence of illocutionary force, following Stalnaker’s (1999) approach to information structure. I show that subjunctive complements to negated epistemic constructions like *no pensar* ‘to not think’ and *no es cierto* ‘it is not certain’ may manifest with two pragmatic functions: evaluative, like emotive predicates, or evidential. Furthermore, I propose that evaluative predicates surface with an uninformative complement clause, which serves only to modify the evaluative matrix clause; in Spanish, the subjunctive mood surfaces in these contexts, while in Greek and Bulgarian, the indicative mood is exhibited. The cross-linguistic variation in these contexts support my claim that these clauses lack illocutionary force.

1. **Overlapping Properties of Negated Epistemics, Emotives and other Negation-Triggered Subjunctive.** Negation-triggered subjunctive traditionally includes complements to evidential predicates, like epistemics, verbs of perception, reported speech and cognitive-factives. The subjunctive mood is typically attributed to the non-veridical semantics of the complement clause, but I provide evidence that complement clauses to negated epistemic expressions cannot always be characterized as such. Unlike subjunctive complements to other evidential predicates in the (b) examples, both negated epistemics and emotives allow positive polarity items (1a), a veridical interpretation on the part of the speaker (2a) and a *de dicto* interpretation (3a). However, all negation-triggered subjunctive complements require negation for licensing, allow long-distance NPIs (4a) and long-distance licensing of the subjunctive mood (5a), properties not shared with those to emotive predicates in the (b) examples.

2. **Negation’s Interaction with Semantic Operators.** To account for the overlapping properties illustrated in (6), I assume a tripartite structure for negation, consisting of a negative operator, a restrictor and a nuclear scope (7), following Partee (1995). I propose that subjunctive complements to negated evidential predicates are interpreted in the scope of negation (7a), while only the matrix clause is in the scope of negation in evaluative contexts (7b). I argue that complements to negated epistemics and epistemic impersonal expressions may have either structure in (7a,b), accounting for the overlapping syntactic and semantic properties exhibited and, consequently, the dual pragmatic status of their complement clauses.

3. **The Information Status of Subjunctive Clauses.** Stalnaker (1999) defines information in terms of *illocutionary force*, which maps propositions into *information states*. I propose that, in Spanish, the subjunctive mood manifests in the absence of illocutionary force, when an evaluative matrix clause carries ‘main point’ status. The complement clause acts as an (uninformative) modifier of the matrix clause in these contexts, and is not mapped into an information state. I provide evidence that the indicative mood is the default mood in Greek and Bulgarian, as the indicative is exhibited in complements to negated epistemic verbs with first person subjects (8a,b, respectively) and emotives, contexts which require the subjunctive mood in Spanish (8c). Thus, languages with mood paradigms may exhibit either mood in uninformative clauses, illustrated in (9); the evidence indicate that mood distribution exhibits a principled pattern cross-linguistically and, furthermore, is syntactically unspecified.
1. a. Adan no pensó/(no) lamentó que Ana (ya) esté aquí.
   'Adam didn’t think/(didn’t) regret that Ana (already) is (SUB) here.

   b. Adan no vio que Ana (*ya) esté aquí.
   'Adam didn’t see that Ana (*already) is (SUB) here.

2. a. Ana no pensó/(no) lamentó que su ex-novio la viera. Pero yo, sí, lo pienso/lamento.
   'Ana didn’t think/(didn’t) regret that her ex-boyfriend saw (SUB) her. But I do think/regret it.

   b. Ana no vio que su ex-novio la viera. #Pero yo, sí, lo vi.
   'Mary didn’t see that her ex-boyfriend saw (SUB) her. #But I did see it.

3. a. Juan no pensó/(no) lamentó que la ventana dañada fuera rota.
   'John didn’t think/(didn’t) regret that the broken window was (SUB) broken.
   \(\textit{de dicto} = \text{damaged window is direct result of complement clause event } \textit{fue rota} \ 'was broken'

   b. Juan no vio que la ventana dañada fuera rota.
   'John didn’t see that the broken window was (SUB) broken.'

4. a. La profesora no pensó/vio que los estudiantes hicieran nada.
   'The professor didn’t think/see that the students did (SUB) anything.'

   b. La profesora no lamentó que los estudiantes hicieran algo/*nada.
   'The professor didn’t regret that the students did (SUB) something/*anything.'

5. a. María no pensó/oyó que Martín crea que Juan se viste/vista mal.
   'Mary didn’t think/hear that Martin believes (SUB) that John dresses (IND/SUB) poorly.'

   b. A María no le gustó que Martín crea que Juan se viste/*vista mal.
   'Mary didn’t like that Martin believes (SUB) that John dresses (IND/*SUB) poorly.'

6. |                      | Emotives | Negated epistemics | Other negated predicates |
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7. a. Neg (evidential: to see that x)
    b. Neg (evaluative: to regret that x)

8. a. Dhen nomizo (oti/na) efige.
    'I don’t think that he left (IND/SUB).'
    (Philippaki-Warburton, 1993)

    b. Ne mislja (če Paulina/Paulina da) e izjala tortata.
    'I don’t think that Paulina ate (IND/SUB) the cake.’
    (Siegel 2009: 1871)

    c. No creo que llueva/*llueve.
    'I don’t believe it is raining (SUB/*IND).'

9. Assertions
   Greek/Bulgarian = Indicative
   Romance = Indicative

   Uninformative propositions
   Greek/Bulgarian = Indicative
   Romance = Subjunctive

   Common Ground

   Context Set

   Strongly Intensional Propositions
   Greek/Bulgarian = Subjunctive
   Romance = Subjunctive

   Other possible worlds